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I. INTRODUCTION 
Of the many issues and problems confronting local governments in these 
times of scarce public resources and monumental public needs, few have re-
ceived as much attention recently as paying for public infrastructurel and pro-
viding for low- and moderate-income housing.2 This is particularly true in 
"growth" states in "sunbelt" regions, such as California, Florida-and Hawaii. 
It is thus both timely and useful for the Land Use Research Foundation of 
Hawaii to have sponsored and published a major study on these very issues: 
Paying for Growth in Hawaii: An Analysis of Impact Fees and HOllsing Exaction 
Programs. While the study is written from a particular point of view-that of 
the land developer-it is a useful and timely contribution to the national debate 
on the subjectS which is critical to Hawaii's future. If we accept that local 
• Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii; A.B., 
DePauw University, 1965; J.D., University of Michigan, 1968; LL.M., Nottingham University 
(England) 1969. Chairman Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law, The American 
Bar Association. 
1 Bosselman 8( Stroud, Legal AJpects of DeveloprlUnt Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT ExACTIONS 
(1987) {hereinafter Bosselrnan 8( Stroud, Legal AJpects}; T. SNYDER 8( M. STEGMAN, PAYING FOR 
GROWTH: USING DEVELOPMENT FEES To FINANCE INFRASTRUC111RE (1986); Bosselrnan 8( StrOud, 
Pariah to Paragon: Defleloper Exactions in Florida 1975-8', 14 STETSON L REV. 527 (1985); 
Callies, Property Rights: Arr The,.e Any Left?, 20 URB. LAw. 597 (1988) {hereinafter Callies, 
Property Rights]; Symposium: Development Impact Fm, 54}. AM. PLAN. A. 3-78 (1988); Exactions: 
A Controflersial New Source for Municipal Funds, 50 LAw 8( CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1-194 (1987); 
Symposium: Linkage Fee Programs, 54 }. AM. PLAN. A. 197-224 (1988); Taub, Exactions, Link-
ages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Pmpectifle, 20 URB. LAw. 515 (1988). 
• Bosselman 8( StrOud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land DtfleloprlUnt Linkages, 9 NOVA 
LJ. 381 (1985) {hereinafter Bosselman 8( Stroud, Land Development Linkages]; Kayden 8( Pol-
lard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analysis: The Connection Between Office Deflel-
opment and Housing, 50 LAw 8( CoNTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1987). 
a Andrew 8( Merriam. Defensible Linkage, 54 J. AM. PLAN. A. 199 (1988); Kayden 8( Pollard, 
supra note 2; Nelson. Downtown Office DeveloprtUnt and Housing Linkage Fees, 54 J. AM. PLAN. A. 
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government can no longer afford the costs of development associated with pro-
viding new roads, parks, schools, water and sewer lines, and so forth, how will 
these be provided? Although housing is not such a "public facility" it is an 
important public need in Hawaii and other parts of the countty. Can govern-
ment force its construction and development in the same fashion that it can 
force construction of public facilities by the development community? Why or 
why not? 
Paying for Growth is the latest in a series of softback studies· dealing with 
the subject of impact fees and other exactions. Though clearly more regional 
than the others, its analyses-particularly the legal and economic-are general 
in nature, with national application. Its main strengths, however, are its well-
written and incisive Conclusion and Commentary6 and its illuminating, if 
somewhat rambling, interviews with key governmental officials6 who will be 
charged with implementing impact fee and housing exaction programs in 
Hawaii. 
This review essay comments upon Paying for Growth while exhaustively sur-
veying the state of the law on impact fees and housing exaction programs. 
Although the chapters on planning, economics, and interviews are interesting, 
they do not address the legal issues raised by impact fees and housing exactions, 
and are therefore treated very lightly. It is the legal issues and their resolution 
that are critically important in states experiencing rapid growth through devel-
opment, such as Hawaii. 
II. IMPAcr FEES, HOUSING EXACTIONS AND PAYING FOR GROWTH 
A. Cone/usion and Commentary: The Last Should be First 
Paying for Growth ends with a conclusion and summary section which should 
have introduced the whole report as an executive summary which is clearly 
needed, and for which the section is admirably suited. Aside from concisely 
summarizing each of the preceding chapters on planning, interviews, law and 
economics, the author' raises key points which it would have been well to con-
sider before delving into the substantive chapters: 
1. Will impact fees, as and when adopted by the four counties of Hawaii, 
197 (1988). 
4 Snyder & Stegman, Paying/or Growth, URB. lAND. INST. (1986); see generally DEVELOPMENT 
EXAcnONS (1987). 
5 PAYING FOR GROWTH IN HAWAII: AN ANAlYSIS OF IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING EXAcnON 
PROGRAMS 171-82 (D. Davidson ed. 1988) (hereinafter PAYING FOR GROWTH}. 
e [d. at 13-86. 
7 Lawyer Dan Davidson, who is also principal editor and Director of the Land Use Research 
Foundation which supponed the srudy. 
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take the place of the many ad hoc governmental requirements for land develop-
ment,8 many of which are unsubstantiated, randomly applied, and often illegal? 
As Davidson notes, most landowners would rather pay than fight, agreeing to 
all manner of requirements which are then often reduced to a unilateral agree-
ment and recorded-a process meant presumably to establish rights against a 
reneging landowner, but which in all probability gives the community no legal 
leverage whatsoever.9 Impact fees and other exaaions set forth in ordinances 
and regulations should replace this ad hoc system with all possible deliberate 
speed. 
2. Housing exactions programs are the achilles heel of an impact fee system 
from a legal perspeaive, and nearly indefensible from an economic perspective, 
in the long run. 10 Unless these conclusions are shown to be significantly in error, 
this does not bode well for the commitment at both county and state level in 
Hawaii to supplement the Governor's bellweather affordable housing produc-
tion schemell with the nation's most stringent affordable housing set-aside pro-
8 What types of exactions are encompassed by a unilateral? The following represents require-
ments that may be imposed depending upon the nature and the size of the development: 
Water. Satisfy Board of Water Supply's requirements for necessary water source, reser-
voir and distribution at developer's COSt. 
o Sewerage. Pay all fees, charges or assessments required for the expansion of off-site 
wastewater treatment facilities needed for project. 
o Parks. Meet statutory requirements of City Park Dedication Ordinance, plus through 
negotiated exactions, dedicate additional land, and/or provide additional private parks. 
o Child Care. Dedicate land or provide commercial space for child-care facility. 
o Inc/usionary Housing. Provide a percentage of units in the project for sale or for rent to 
households of low/moderate income. Sometimes payment of money or dedication of 
land in lieu of the housing set-aside have been accepted. 
Transportation Improvements. Various, including: 
a. Dedication of land and/or payment of fees for road widening. 
b. Signalization of intersections. 
c. Total or partial funding of freeway interchanges adjoining project. 
d. Pedestrian overpass, sometimes several miles from project. 
e. Implementation of transportation system management program, including dedication 
of land for park'n'ride facility. 
o Job Training. Establish job-training program in connection with resort projects. 
o Other Dedications. Provide land for beach access, hiking trails, school sites, government 
facilities such as police or fire stations, archaeological research, public parking, and 
wildlife sanctuaries. 
PAYING FOR GROWTIi, supra note 5, at 172-73. 
9 Id. at 172. 
10 Id. at 176-77. 
11 Governor John Waihee proposes to spend up to $120 million for raw land and another 
$120 million for infrastructure in order to stimulate construction of thousands of "affordable" 
($90,000-$140,000) single-family homes in the Ewa district of Oahu, west of downtown Hono-
lulu and adjacent to Pearl Harbor, as well as several thousand such units on each of the neighbor 
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grams. 12 The legal literature is filled with warnings and reservations about the 
defensibility of such set-asides, and the few cases on the subject sound an 
equally pessimistic tone, as discussed below in Part II-A. 
B. The Legal Analysis 
Of most interest to lawyers is the legal analysis chapter of Paying for Growth 
which attempts to set out the legal bases for impact fees and housing exac-
tions. 13 Its author finds abundant support for the former, but precious little for 
the latter. In this he is probably right. 
1. Impact Fees: The Need, The Ground Rules 
The rapid growth of new development in many areas is placing a severe 
strain on the financial capacity of local government to fund the large capital 
outlays for schools, parks, roads, sewers and other facilities required by new 
residents. Traditional methods of funding such public facilities often prove in-
adequate. Customary funding of capital facilities Out of general funds or bond 
proceeds may lead to existing residents paying more than their "fair share" of 
the cost of the public infrastructure built to serve new residents. 14 Assessments 
are often inadequate because they are usually restricted to a zone or improve-
ment immediately adjacent to the property assessed. HI "In-lieu" fees developed 
as a refinement of the now well-accepted practice of required dedication of some 
types of infrastructure as a condition of subdivision approval. In-lieu fees substi-
tute a money payment for dedication when the latter is not feasible, as, for 
example, when a school is needed and dedication requirements based on a small 
proposed land development would result in an inadequate site, or one which is 
poorly located. 
islands of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai. ~ernor Pushes for 64,000 Affordable Homes, Honolulu 
Adveniser, Feb. 5, 1988, at A3, col. 1; see also Ewa Land Condemnation Eyed, Honolulu Adver-
tiser, Feb. 10, 1988, at AI, col. 1. 
12 The Office of State Planning has successfully sought conditions on State Land Use Commis-
sion approval of convening private land from agricultural to urban use (for residential develop-
ment) which would require developers to "set aside" 60% of the residential units as "affordable": 
available to those families with incomes 80% to 120% of median - $34,000 - income. The 
selling price would be $80,000 - $125,000. Condition Put On Housing Project, Honolulu Adver-
tiser, Nov. 17, 1987, at A3, col. 5. 
IS Kudo, Impact Feel and Housing Exactions Programs: A Legal Analysis, in PAYING FOR 
GROWTH, supra note 5, at 87. 
14 See Gilhool & Heyman, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New 
Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE LJ. 1119, 1121 (1964). 
15 Callies, A Hypothetical Case, 16 URB. LAw. ANN. 155 (1979). 
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Impact fees have recently emerged as a more flexible method of coping with 
inadequate public facilities brought about by rapid growth and development. In 
Contractors & Builders Association fl. City 0/ Dunedinl6 the Florida Supreme 
Court grasped the financial plight of cash strapped municipalities seeking alter-
native sources of revenue: 
We see no reason to require that a municipality resort to deficit financing, in 
order to raise capital by means of utility rates and charges. On the contrary, 
sound public policy militates against any such inflexibility. It may be a simpler 
task to amortize a known outlay, than to predict population trends and the other 
variables necessary to arrive at an accurate forecast of future capital needs. But 
raising capital for future use by means of rates and charges may permit a munici-
pality to take advantage of favorable conditions, which would alter before money 
could be raised through issuance of debt securities; and the day may not be far 
distant when municipalities cannot compete successfully with other borrowers for 
needed capital.17 
Impact fees are charges collected by local governments from new land develop-
ments, to pay for a public faciliry constructed to benefit such new develop-
ments, which fees are no more than the costs of the faciliry. The fees collected 
are set aside, separate from general revenues. l8 
Impact fees are superior to in-lieu fees, dedications, and assessments for the 
following reasons: 
(1) Impact fees can be used to fund types of capital facilities not usually subject 
to dedication requirements and fees in-lieu thereof. 
(2) Since they are not tied to dedication requirements, impact fees can more 
easily be applied to public facilities the need for which is generated by, but 
located ourside of, the development. 
(3) Impact fees can be applied to condominiums, aparrments, and commercial 
developments which create the need for extra-development capital expendi-
tures, but which often escape dedication or in-lieu fee requirements. 
(4) Impact fees can be collected at various stages, such as when building per-
mits are issued, or at other times when growth creating a need for new 
services occurs, rather than at the time of subdivision plarting, where tradi-
tional exactions and in-lieu fees are usually collected. 19 
18 329 So. 2d 314,319-20 (Fla. 1976). 
17 Id. 
18 Callies, Propery Rights, supra note I, at 632; Nicholas, Capital Impl'01Jement Finance and 
Impact Fees After the Growth Management Act of 198.5, in PERSPECIlvES ON FLORIDA'S GROWTIi 
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1985 175, 178, 188 (986). 
18 Callies, Property Rights, supra note I, at 632-33; Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure: 
Paying the Costs of Growth Through Impact Fees and Other Land Regulation Charges, in THE 
CHANGING STRUClURE OF INFRASTRUClURE FINANCE (J. Nicholas ed. 1985) [hereinafter Juergen-
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a. The Legal Tests 
In assessing the validity of impact fees, courts first inquire into whether local 
government is authorized to impose the fee. (This issue is addressed above in 
subsection b.) If there is sufficient authority to impose a fee, courts commonly 
address the relationship between the development upon which the fee was lev-
ied and the amount and use planned for the fee. Generally, courtS have used 
three approaches in determining the reasonableness of this relationship: (1) the 
"rational nexus" test, as applied by the Florida courts and the majority of other 
jurisdictions; (2) the more restrictive "specifically and uniquely attriburable" 
test, as applied in Illinois; and (3) the less restrictive - indeed generous - "rea-
sonable relationship" test, applied by the California courts. 
t. The Rational Nexus Test 
The rational nexus test is the most widely used standard for examining de-
velopment exactions, and especially the impact fee. This test has two parts. 
First, the particular development must create a "need," to which the amount of 
the exaction bears some roughly proportional relationship. Second, the local 
government must demonstrate that the fees levied will actually be used for the 
purpose collected, by proper "earmarking" and timely expenditure of the 
funds. 20 
The Florida courts have adopted the rational nexus test for impact fees in a 
series of recent decisions, beginning with Contractors & Builders AIJociation v. 
City of Dunedin.21 There, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the concept of 
impact fees, even though it struck down the particular ordinance requiring an 
impact fee for sewer and water connection, for failing to sufficiently restrict the 
use of fees collected: "In principle, however, we see nothing wrong with trans-
ferring to the new user of a municipally owned water or sewer system a fair 
share of the costs new use of the system involves. "22 For an impact fee ordi-
nance to be valid, the court held that: (1) new development must generate a 
need for expansion of public facilities; (2) the fees imposed must be no more 
than what the municipality would incur in accommodating the new users of the 
system; and (3) the fees must be expressly earmarked for the purposes for 
which they were charged. 23 
smeyer, Funding Infrastructure}. 
10 Bosse1man & Stroud, supra note 2, at 397-99; Callies, Property Rights, supra note 1, at 633; 
Stroud, Legal Consideratiom of Development Impact Fees, 54 ]. AM. PLAN. A. 29, 31 (988). 
u 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976) . 
• 12 Id. at 317-18 . 
. 13 Id. 
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The rational nexus test developed by the Florida courts comes from require-
ments set out by the Wisconsin Supreme COUrt in Jordan v. Village o[ Me-
nomonee Falls. 24 There, the court upheld an ordinance requiring a developer to 
dedicate land for school, park and recreation purposes, or pay an in-lieu fee of 
$200 per residential lot for schools and $80 per lot for park and recreation 
development: 
In most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the 
land required to be dedicated for a park or school site was to meet a need solely 
attributable to the anticipated influx of people into the community to occupy this 
particular subdivision. 211 
If the municipality could establish that a group of subdivisions over a period 
of years generated the need for school or park facilities to benefit the influx of 
new residents, then this would establish a reasonable basis for finding that the 
need for the exaction was occasioned by the activity of the subdivider. In this 
case, the municipality met the "need" portion of the rational nexus test by 
showing increases in both school population and village population, requiring 
the village to expend large sums for acquisition of park and school lands and 
construction of additional school facilities. 
The court also upheld the reasonableness of the exactions because the public 
expendirures for school and park facilities greatly exceeded the amount exacted 
from subdividers by way of land dedication and in-lieu fees. This established a 
sufficient benefit to the subdivision, thus meeting another part of the rational 
nexus test. The court rejected the argument that residents other than those liv-
ing in the subdivision would make use of the school and park facilities as 
immaterial. 
These requirements were further refined in Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward 
County,28 upholding an ordinance requiring dedication, an in-lieu fee, or an 
impact fee as a condition of plat approval, to be used for the capital costs of 
expanding the county park system. The court held that the ordinance was a 
valid exercise of the police power: 
[W}e discern the general legal principle that reasonable dedication or impact fee 
requirements are permissible so long as they offset needs sufficiently attributable 
to the subdivision and so long as the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for 
the substantial benefit of the subdivision residents. In order to satisfy these re-
quirements, the local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection, or 
rational nexus, between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in 
2. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1966). 
26 Id. at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447. 
26 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cerl. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983). 
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population generated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must show 
a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds 
collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision. 27 
Seven months later, another Florida coun upheld an impact fee for road 
improvements in Home Builders & Contractors Association v. Board 0/ County 
Commissioners.28 The County ordinance required new land development activity 
generating road traffic (including residential, commercial and industrial uses) to 
pay a fair share of the cost of expanding new roads attributable to the new 
development. The court found that the ordinance met the Dunedin tests for a 
valid impact fee because it recognized that the rapid rate of new development 
would require a substantial increase in the capacity of the county road system, 
and tied this need to the new development by a formula based on the costs of 
road construction and number of motor vehicle trips generated by different 
types of land use. Moreover, the ordinance sufficiently earmarked the funds col-
lected for the benefit of the fee payer because expenditure of funds is localized 
by a zone system with separate trust funds for each zone. The coun finally 
noted that the cost of construction of additional roads would far exceed the fees 
imposed on the developer by the ordinance.29 More imponantly, Home Builders 
also rejected the argument that improvements paid for by impact fees must be 
used exclusively or overwhelmingly for the benefit of those who pay: "It is diffi-
cult to envision any capital improvement for parks, sewers, drainage, roads, or 
whatever, which would not in some measure benefit members of the commu-
nity who do not reside in or utilize the new development,"3o 
These decisions show that impact fees can be a valid and effective means of 
coping with rapid growth, but that the couns will scrutinize such fees to ensure 
that they remain within reasonable limits. The Florida couns, as well as couns 
of other jurisdictions applying the rational nexus test, follow the modern trend 
of limiting exactions not by arbitrary rules regarding the nature of the facilities 
or the type of development, but by requiring the earmarking of funds to be 
used to provide some nonexclusive "benefit" to the development which paid the 
fee. 31 
27431 So. 2d ac 611-12 (emphasis added). 
28 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Disc. Cc. App. 1983). 
28 [d. ac 145. 
80 Id. ac 143. 
31 See, e.g., Bosselman & Scroud, Land Development Linkages, supra note 2, at 398. 
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II. The California "Reasonable Relationship" Test as Modified by the United 
States Supreme Court 
As a general rule, California courts uniformly upheld (until Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission)S2 the constirutionality of required dedication or pay-
ment of a fee as a condition of land use approval where the following conditions 
were met: (1) the municipality is acting within its police power; (2) the condi-
tions have a reasonable relation to the public welfare; and (3) the municipality 
does not act in an arbitraty manner. 
As to the first requirement, the California courts gave a broad interpretation 
to the police power. Rigorous land use regulations, and development exactions 
in particular, constitute a proper exercise of the police power. The leading Cali-
fornia case is Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek: ss 
The rationale of the cases affirming constitutionality indicate the dedication stat-
utes are valid under the state's police power. They reason that the subdivider 
realizes a profit from govemmental approval of a subdivision since his land is 
rendered more valuable by the fact of subdivision, and in return for this benefit 
the city may require him to dedicate a portion of his land for park purposes 
whenever the influx of new residents will increase the need for park and recrea-
tional facilities. . . . Such exactions have been compared to admittedly valid 
zoning regulations such as minimum lot size and setback requirements. 8. 
As to the second requirement, California courts required that exactions bear 
only some reasonable relationship to the needs created by the development. In 
Walnut Creek, the court rejected any direct or rational nexus theoty, stating that 
an ordinance requiring dedication or in-lieu fees .. can be justified on the basis of 
a general public need for recreational facilities caused by present and future 
subdivisions. "311 
This broad rationale was virtually eliminated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 36 Decided on the last day of 
the Court's 1987 term, Nollan deals ostensibly with beach access. Plaintiffs 
sought a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission in 
order to tear down a beach house and build a bigger one. The Commission 
conditioned the permit on the granting of an easement to permit the public to 
use one-third of the property on the beach side. For the privilege of substan-
tially upgrading a beach house, the owner was forced to dedicate to the public 
82 107 S. Ce. 3141 (1987). 
83 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971). 
U [d. ae 644-45, 94 Cal. Rpcr. ae 639, 484 P.2d ae 615. 
3& [d. at 638, 94 Cal. Rpcr. at 634, 484 P.2d ae 610. 
88 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
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lateral access over much of his backyard for more beach for the public to walk 
upon. The California Coun of Appeals had held this was a valid exercise of the 
Commission's police power under its statutOry dury to protect the California 
Coast. The United States Supreme Coun reversed. Noting that the taking of 
such an access over private properry by itself would require compensation, the 
Coun then examined whether the same requirement, imposed under the police 
or regulatory power of the Commission rather than under its powers of eminent 
domain, would modify the "just compensation" requirement. 
The Coun held that it did not and that compensation was required. The 
rationale of the Coun is critical. The Coun observed that land use regulations 
do not effect takings if they substantially advance legitimate state interests and 
do not deny an owner the economically viable use of his land. But even assum-
ing (without deciding) that legitimate state interests include, in the Commis-
sion's words, protecting public views of the beach and assisting the public in 
overcoming the psychological barrier to the beach created by overdevelopment, 
the Coun could not accept the Commission's position that there was a nexus 
between these interests and the condition attached to Nollan's beach house 
redevelopment: 
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on 
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obsta-
cles to viewing the beach created by the new house; It is also impossible to 
understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, 
or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construc-
tion of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that the Commission's imposi-
tion of the permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its land use power 
for any of these purposes.37 
However, said the Coun, it is an altogether different matter if there is an 
"essential nexus" between the condition (read impact fee or exaction) and what 
the landowner proposes to do with the properry: 
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would 
have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding the construc-
tion of the new house-for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a 
ban on fences-so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power 
(as we assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposi-
tion of the condition would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come 
closer to the facts of the present case), the condition would be constitutional even 
if it consisted of the requirement that the N ollans provide a viewing spot on their 
property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would 
37 Id. at 3149. 
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interfere. 
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition sub-
stituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justifi-
cation for the prohibition. {nhe lack of nexus between the condition and the 
original purpose of the building restriction convects that purpose into something 
other than what it was. The purpose becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an 
easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of "legitimate state interests" in 
the takings and land use context, this is not one of them.3s 
In short, the Supreme Court appears to have adopted the "rational nexus 
test concerning exactions, in-lieu fees and impact fees over the broader Califor-
nia rule which apparently affected the imposition of the condition on the Nollan 
property. The case also means that naked linkage programs, which seek to im-
pose fees, dedications and conditions on the development process merely be-
cause the developer needs a permit and the public sector needs an unrelated 
public project, are in all probability also illegal. As one well-known commenta-
tor suggests in comments upon a proposed Chicago ordinance: 
It will be difficult enough to sustain a housing linkage program on the ground 
that there is a reasonable relationship between the construction of commercial 
office space and the need for additional housing. It will be even more difficult to 
demonstrate that connection when the exacted payments are used for a variety of 
unknown neighborhood development projects.39 
Following the lead of the first (and still valid) requirement of Walnut Creek, 
California courts have upheld the use of impact fees as a proper exercise of a 
municipality's police power. In J. W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego,·o the Court 
of Appeals held that San Diego could use its police power to impose "facilities 
benefit assessments" (FBA's) on deVelopers in order to fund a broad spectrum 
of public improvements including water, sewer, roads, parks, transit and trans-
portation, libraries, fire stations, school buildings and police stations.· l FBA 
payments were earmarked for the area of benefit and solely for the purpose for 
38 Id. at 3147-48. 
39 Smith, From SubdiviJion Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit AiJeJJmentJ and 
Linkage Payments: A Brief HiJlory of Land Development ExactionJ, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 
28 (1987). See aiJo Bosselman & Stroud, Land Development LinkageJ, Jupra note 2; Valla, 
Linkage: The Next Stop in Developing ExactionJ, GROWTH MGMT. STUD. NEWSL., June 1987, at 4; 
Kayden & Pollard, Linkage OrdinanceJ and Traditional ExactionJ AnaIYJiJ: The Connection Be-
tween Office Development and HouJing, 50 LAw & CONTEMPT. PROBS. 127 (987) . 
• 0 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984) . 
., Id. at 749, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83. 
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which the fee was levied.42 The court rejected a challenge that the FBA's were 
an invalid tax, finding that the new development paying the fees was ade-
quately benefited from the improvements since the FBA' s were tied' closely to 
the planning process. The court also examined the underlying policy of what the 
City was trying to do in controlling explosive growth: "The vision of San Di-
ego's future as sketched in the general plan is attainable only through the com-
prehensive financing scheme contemplated by the FBA.' '48 
As these decisions demonstrate, the California test grants broad discretion to 
municipalities in the area of development exactions. Because of the underlying 
rationale of development as a "privilege," developers rarely succeed in challeng-
ing fees imposed as a condition of development. The standard employed by the 
California courts in reviewing such fees is, however, less stringent than the ra-
tional nexus test applied by the majority of other jurisdictions.44 
tit. The Specifically and Uniquely Attributable Test: Impact Fees Stillborn? 
A shrinking minority of jurisdictions apply the specifically and uniquely at-
tributable test, primarily in cases involving dedication and/or in-lieu fees. Illi-
nois has in the past made the most prolific use of this test, established in Pio-
neer Trust & Saflings Bank fl. Village of Mount Prospect.40 There, a developer 
challenged the validity of an ordinance requiring subdividers to dedicate one 
acre per 60 residential lots for schools, parks, and other public purposes. The 
Illinois Supreme Court said: 
But because the requirement that a plat of subdivision be approved affords an 
appropriate point of control with respect to costs made necessary by the subdivi-
sion, it does not follow that communities may use this point of control to solve all 
of the problems which they can foresee!& 
To be considered a reasonable regulation under the police power, requirements 
imposed upon the subdivider must be within the statutory grant of power to 
the municipality, and must be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to his 
development. The need for additional school and recreational facilities, although 
admittedly aggravated by the 250-unit subdivision, was not specifically and 
uniquely attributable to the new development and thus, should not be "cast 
upon the subdivider as his sole financial burden." The fact that the present 
42 [d. at 749-50, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 583. 
48 [d. at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589 . 
.. See Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 1983). 
40 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961). 
48 [d. at 379-80,176 N.E.2d at 801 (quoting Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 
448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960». 
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school facilities of Mount Prospect were near capacity was the result of the total 
development of the community.47 Therefore, the dedication requirement was 
held to be an invalid taking without just compensation. 
Rhode Island briefly adopted the Pioneer Trust test in Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. 
City of Cranston.48 The court struck down a city regulation requiring subdivid-
ers to dedicate at least seven percent of the land area of the proposed plat to the 
city to be used for recreation purposes. It held that the involuntary dedication 
of land is a valid exercise of the police power only to the extent that the need 
for the land required to be donated results from the "specific and unique activ-
ity attributable to the developer. "49 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently applied the specifically and 
uniquely attributable test in a similar case, J.E.D. Associates v. Town of Atkin-
son. &0 The court struck down as an unconstitutional taking an ordinance requir-
ing each subdivision developer to dedicate seven and one-half percent of their 
total acreage or pay a proportionate fee for playgrounds or for other town use. 
By applying the restrictive Pioneer Trust test to developer exactions, courts 
imposed substantially the same requirements as a special assessment, thus effec-
tively precluding their use for most extra-development capital funding purposes. 
The Pioneer Trust test quickly became difficult to reconcile with local govern-
ments' planning and funding problems caused by rapidly accelerating develop-
ment. Consequently, state courts began turning away from this restrictive stan-
dard. IH Indeed, both Illinois and Rhode Island appear to have abandoned it 
altogether .112 
b. Authority 
In analyzing the validity of impact fees and other developer exactions, many 
courts first inquire whether the local government has sufficient authority to im-
pose the fee. 1I3 However, lack of explicit enabling legislation is rarely fatal. Most 
jutisdictions lack specific legislative authority for impact fees, though several 
have recently enacted such statutes. Most courts find authority in one or a com-
bination of the following sources: (1) the home rule powers granted to munici-
palities by the state constitution; (2) state statutes empowering local govern-
ments to regulate in the general areas of zoning, planning, subdivisions, or in 
47 Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802. 
4S 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970). 
49 Id. at 71,264 A.2d at 914 . 
• 0 121 N.H. 581,432 A.2d 12 (1981) . 
• , ). )uergensmeyer, Funding InfraJtructure, Jupra note 19 . 
• 2 Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) . 
• 3 ). )uergensmeyer, Funding InfraJtructure, supra note 19, at 23, 25. 
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specific areas like water and sewer; or (3) in a state statutes' general welfare 
clause. 
t. Broad Interpretation of Police Power 
The California courts have found authority for impact fees and exactions on 
developers in a broad interpretation of the home rule powers of municipalities 
set forth in the California Constitution. Such fees and exactions are uniformly 
upheld as a valid exercise of police power as long as they are "reasonable" and 
not arbitrary.M As to the police power, the California Constirution states that 
"a county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sani-
tary and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws. "1111 
The leading California case which established developer exactions as a valid 
exercise of a municipality's police power is Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City 
of Walnut Creek. lIs Following the lead of Walnut Creek, the California courts 
have upheld the use of impact fees as a proper exercise of a municipality's 
police power. 117 
In Amherst Builders v. City of Amherst,1I8 the Ohio Supreme Court also inter-
preted its state constirution broadly to find authorization for a municipality to 
impose "connection" fees to fund capital improvements to the city sewer 
system: 
It is well-setded that Section 4, Article XVIII, grants a municipality broad power 
to own and operate public utilities, and that a municipal sewage system is a type 
of "public utility" by that constitutional provision. There can be no doubt that, 
in order to exercise that power, a municipality must be able to impose charges 
upon the users of the system to defray the costs of both its construaion and 
operation . . . . When this unimproved land is developed, the tap-in charge is 
imposed so that these new users will now assume a fair share of the original 
construaion costs, thereby reimbursing the community for the previous benefit 
received. tl9 
54 D. CURTIN, DEDICATIONS, EXACTIONS AND IN LIEU FEES; THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION-
TAKING ISSUE (1986). 
tItI CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
06 4 Cal. 3d 633, 644-45, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630,639, 484 P.2d 606, 615 (1971). 
tl7 In J.W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 
(1984), the Court of Appeals held that San Diego could use its police power to impose "facilities 
benefit assessments" (FBA's) on developers in order to fund a broad spectrum of public improve-
ments including water, sewer, roads, parks, transit and transportation, libraries, fire stations, 
school buildings and police stations. 
tl8 61 Ohio St. 2d 345, 402 N.E.2d 1181 (1980). 
tl9 Id. at 347, 402 N.E.2d at 1183. 
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Until 1985, Florida lacked specific statutory authority for impact fees. De-
spite the absence of express enabling legislation, Florida courts have interpreted 
the home rule powers of local governments broadly in upholding their authority 
to impose impact fees. Home rule powers of municipalities and counties come 
from different sources. Municipalities receive home rule powers from the Florida 
Constitution: "Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprie-
tary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform munici-
pal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for 
municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law,"60 These home rule 
powers are further broadened by the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act which 
provides that "the Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set 
forth in . . . the State Constitution, the legislative body of each municipality 
has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the 
state Legislature may act ... 61 
In Contractors & Builders Association v. City of Dunedin,62 the Florida Su-
preme Court held that a water and sewer impact fee ordinance was authorized 
under article VIII, section 2(b) of the state constitution, even though the court 
eventually struck down the ordinance on the grounds that it did not sufficiently 
restrict the uses of fees collected. Since no state laws existed governing impact 
fees for capital improvements, the municipality was free to act: 
"Under the constitution, Dunedin, as the corporate proprietor of its water and 
sewer systems, can exercise the powers of any other such proprietor (except as Fla. 
Stat. {sections IBO.Ol-.31J or statutes enacted hereafter, may otherwise provide) 
. . . . Implicit in the power to provide municipal services is the power to con-
StruCt, maintain and operate the necessary facilities,"63 
In granting home rule powers to counties, the Florida constitution differenti-
ates berween charter and non-charter counties: "Counties operating under 
county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent 
with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors.' '64 This 
delegation of powers is equivalent to the broad home rule powers granted mu-
nicipalities. In Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,6/) the court held that the 
constitutional provision cited above authorized the county to enact an impact 
fee ordinance for parks: 
80 FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) (1968). 
81 FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (1979) (citing FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) (1968». 
82 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976). 
83 Ii. ar 319 (quoring Coolesey v. Utilities Comm'n, 261 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1972». 
8_ FLA. CONST. an. VIII, § 1(g) (Supp. 1968). 
85 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Disr. Cr. App. 1983). 
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Through this provision, the people of Florida have vested broad home rule pow-
ers in charter counties such as Broward County .... 
The people have said that charter county governments shall have all the powers 
of local government unless the state government takes affirmative steps to pre-
empt local legislation . . . . In the absence of preemptive federal or state statu-
toty or constitutional law, the paramount law of a charter county is its charter.1I1I 
Non-chatter counties, on the other hand, must find a source of enabling 
legislation to authorize their actions.87 Various sources of enabling legislation 
have been broadly interpreted to authorize non-chatter counties to enact impact 
fee ordinances. In Home BuilderJ & ContractorJ AsJociation v. Board of County 
CommiJJionerJ,88 the court found authority for Palm Beach County to impose a 
roads impact fee in a state statute granting counties broad powers to carry on 
county government: 
(1) The legislative and governing body of a county shall have the power to carty 
on county government. To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law, 
this power shall include, but shall not be restricted to, the power to: 
(m) Provide and regulate arterial, toll, and other roads, bridges, tunnels and re-
lated facilities . . . . 
(w) Petform any other acts not inconsistent with law which are in the common 
interest of the people of the county, and exercise all powers and privileges not 
specifically prohibited by law.1I1I 
The court emphasized that "one of the legislative purposes in passing Chapter 
125 was to enable local governments to govern themselves without the necessity 
of running to the legislature every year for authority to act."70 
In 1985, the Florida Legislature enacted the Local Government Comprehen-
sive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act that substantially 
amended the state's major land development laws and created explicit statutory 
authority for impact fees for the first time.71 
ii. Implied Authority from Enabling StatuteJ 
While not recognizing such broad home rule powers of local governments as 
California and Florida, other states have upheld impact fees as valid exercises of 
.. rd. at 609 . 
• 7 FLA. CoNST. an. VIII, § 1(0 (Supp. 1986) . 
.. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) . 
•• rd. at 142 (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 125.0I(1)(m) & (w) (1981». 
70 rd. at 143. 
71 Bosselman & Stroud, Legal AspeclJ, Jupra note I, at 549-50. 
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local government authority by implication from a variety of statutory sources. In 
Coulter v. City of Rawlins,n the Wyoming court held that the enactment of 
impact fee ordinances for water and sewer was not a constitutional home tule 
power of the municipality and thus was subject to express legislative control. 
After an extensive review of the City's enabling legislation, the court found 
implied authority to impose impact fees for water and sewer connections. Gen-
eral powers granted to cities included taking any action necessaty to establish, 
alter and regulate public water sources. In addition, zoning powers included 
power to enact zoning regulations to 'facilitate adequate provisions for transpor-
tation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements."" Another 
statute empowered municipalities to "take any action necessary to establish, 
purchase, extend, maintain and regulate a water system for supplying water to . 
its inhabitants and for any other public purposes" and to charge rates for such 
services.7• Reading all of these statutes together, the court held: 
Given the above authorities, we come to the conclusion that the Wyoming statu-
tory provisions previously cited grant the Ciry of Rawlins the power to levy the 
sewer and water connection charges . . . . Although no cited statute specifically 
provides that cities and towns are authorized to charge new users a certain speci-
fied fee for connecting or hooking up with the sewer and water systems, we 
concluded that the authoriry for such ordinances as those enacted by the Ciry of 
Rawlins, in this case, can be fairly and necessarily implied from the powers ex-
pressly granted in the statutes.711 
In City of Arvada v. City of Denver,78 the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
the city was authorized to enact an ordinance imposing a "development fee" on 
all new users connecting into the city water system for the purposes of future 
development. The court looked to enabling legislation giving municipalities the 
power to collect from users any rates, fees, or charges for services furnished in 
connection with water facilities.77 The court stated: 
While the imposition of a development fee as such is not authorized in this 
section, we hold that such a charge is within the general contemplation of this 
broadly worded statute . . . these provisions reveal that the General Assembly 
intended to give municipalities broad, general powers to construct, improve and 
extend all the facilities necessary to operate a viable water system, and that this 
71 662 P.2d 888, 895 (Wyo. 1983). 
7S Id. at 896 (emphasis in original). 
74 Id. at 897-98. 
T& !d. at 900; see abo Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977). 
7' 663 P.2d 61l (Colo. 1983). 
TT Id. at 614. 
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power includes authorization to accumulate a fund for future development.78 
iii. Broad Interpretation of General Welfare Clause 
Other states have interpreted the general welfare clause of various state stat-
utes as an independent source of municipal power, broad enough to confer 
power to enact impact fees and other developer exactions. For example, in the 
leading Utah case of Call v. City of West Jordan,79 which upheld an ordinance 
requiring dedication of land or in-lieu fees for park and recreation facilities as a 
condition of subdivision, the court reviewed a series of statutes enabling cities 
to regulate for the health, safety, and general welfare and to regulate planning 
and subdivisions: 
If the above statutes are viewed together, and in accordance with their intent and 
purpose, as they should be, it seems plain enough that the ordinance in question 
is within the scope of authority and responsibility of the city government in the 
promotion of the "health, safety, morals and general welfare" of the 
community.80 
The Utah Supreme Court also relied on the general welfare power of municipal-
ities in upholding an ordinance requiring "connection fees" to defray the costs 
of a new sewer system. "In Utah, municipalities are granted broad powers for 
the protection of the health and welfare of their residents. Among these powers 
is the statutoty authority to establish and maintain public utilities for the bene-
fit of those residents."81 The authority of local governments in Utah to impose 
impact fees is now well established. Citing Call and Rupp, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City,82 stated, "These 
. . . decisions have resolved the legality of water connection and park improve-
ment fees designed to raise funds to enlarge and improve sewer and water sys-
tems and recreational opportunities, as well as the legality of conditioning water 
hookups or plat approval on their collection. --83 
tv. Statutory Authority 
Despite the general tendency of courts to find numerous grounds to uphold 
78 Id. at 614-15. 
79 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). 
80 Id. at 219. 
81 Rupp v. Grantsville City, 6\0 P.2d 338, 339-40 (Utah 1980). 
82 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). 
83 Id. at 901. 
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impact fees without statutory authority, several commentators have suggested 
that such statutes would be useful.So' Indeed, Texas, Florida and Illinois have 
enacted such statutes, in part as a result of court rulings striking down impact 
fees and in part in order to clarify or limit the application of impact fees to 
specific categories of public facilities. 
The most publicized of these statutes is that of Texas.81i Largely a reaction to 
Texas decisions implying that home-rule communities in Texas might have the 
unrestricted right to levy impact fees,88 the statute limits the levy of impact fees 
to specific public improvements: water supply, treatment and distribution; was-
tewater collection and treatment; storm water drainage and flood control, and 
certain roadway facilities.87 The balance of the statute appears primarily di-
rected toward limiting overreaching local governments in the levying and collec-
tion of impact fees. Thus, fees may not be levied until a local government has 
substantially documented the need for such fees by creating public facility ser-
vice areas, making growth and land use projections therefore, calculating the 
cost of new and expanded facilities which will be required (carefully segregating 
out the repair and rehabilitation of existing facilities) and development of a 
conversion matrix to aid in calculating and applying fees. The fee itself is de-
rived by dividing "service units" into capital improvement costS.88 Funds col-
lected must be deposited in trust funds, one each for each type of capital facil-
ity, and refunded within ten years if not spent as anticipated.89 While 
assessment of the fee early in the development process is encouraged, so is late 
collection.90 
While there appear to be sound arguments for authority of Illinois munici-
palities to adopt impact fees without specific enabling legislation,91 the state 
adopted a limited authorization statute in 1987.92 The purpose of the statute is 
to permit county legislative bodies in those counties within certain limited pop-
ulation ranges to levy transportation impact fees on new developments with 
84 larsen & Zimet, Impact Fees; Et Tu, II/inoiJ? 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 489 (1988); Lil-
lydahl, Neison, Ramis, Rivasplata & Schell, The Need For a Standard State Impact Fee Enabling 
Act, 54]. AM. PLAN. A. 7 (1988); T. MORGAN. THE EFFECT OF STATE LEGISLATION ON THE LAw 
OF IMPACT FEES. WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON TEXAS LEGISLATION (1988); Taylor & McClendon, 
Impact Fee Enabling LegiJlation: A New Approach to ExactionJ 11 Zoning & Plan. Law Rep. 9 
(1988). 
8& TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. an. 1269j - 4.11 (Vernon 1987). 
88 E.g., City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984). 
87 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. an. 1269j - 4.11 §1(2) (Vernon 1987). 
88 Id. at §§ 1(5). 1(9), 1(10), 2(d) & 2(j). 
89 Id. at § 5(c). 
90 Id. § 2(e). For general analysis of the Texas Statute, see T. MORGAN. Jupra note 84; Taylor 
& McOendon. Jupra note 84. 
91 Larsen & Zimet. Jupra note 84. 
92 42 ILL. REV. STAT ch. 121, 1) 5-608 (1987). 
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access (direct or indirect) to county road or state highway systems. The fee must 
be calculated on the bases of the estimated traffic the new development is ex-
pected to generate, together with that which is needed to maintain service. The 
legislation contemplates the creation of transportation districts, and the money, 
to be placed in special funds as collected, must be spent either in the district in 
which the development paying the fee is located, or in areas immediately 
adjacent.93 
Both statutes are clearly limited in their application and may have the effect 
of foreclosing other impact fees on the ground of state preemption unless courts 
can be convinced of the existence of some sort of "shared power" doctrine. The 
potential problem is illustrated in New Jersey which has a relatively recent land 
development exactions statute sufficiently narrow (and narrowly interpreted by 
the courts in the state) that there are presently calls for enabling legislation to 
make impact fees legal. 94 
c. Plan Implementation 
Impact fee ordinances should implement comprehensive plans. This helps 
insure that the ordinance ties the fees to needs generated by new development 
and that the planned improvements adequately benefit the development paying 
the fee. 
A recent Arkansas decision, City 0/ Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc.,9f> emphasizes this 
point. The court invalidated a park impact fee ordinance because the city did 
not have a sufficiently definite plan for parks and park facilities to justify the 
fee. 96 If a fee is to be collected from new development for park acquisition 
and/or park facilities construction, then the jurisdiction should have a plan for 
parks and should have a standard for park facilities against which the validity 
and fairness of the parks impact fee can be judged. Courts have held that a 
payment of a fee by a developer in exchange for plat approval for acquiring and 
developing county parks was a valid exercise of the police power, approving of 
the county park program establishing a ratio of three acres for every thousand 
residents and restricting the funds to be used to an area within fifteen miles 
from the development which paid the fees. 97 
Tying impact fees into the general plan helps insure that the court will view 
83 Id. 
114 Note, Impact Fees in New Jersey: Allocating the Cost of Land Development, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 
341 (1988). 
85 281 Ark. 63, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983); see Kaiser & Mentes, Permissible Parameter of Park 
Exactions, 65 U. DETROIT 1. REV. 1, at 19-20 (1987). 
ee 281 Ark. at 67, 659 S.W.2d ac 507. 
9'7 See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 607-08 (Fla. Disc. Ct. App. 
1983). 
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the fees as valid development regulations, rather than illegal taxes. It is useful to 
lay the foundation for impact fees within the comprehensive plan itself and 
then implement them through regulatory ordinances that are consistent with the 
plan. Often, it is necessary to amend an existing comprehensive plan to make it 
a suitable basis for impact fees. 88 
In HilliJ Homel, Inc. v. Public Utility DiJtrict,88 the Washington Supreme 
Court upheld a "general facilities charge" imposed for the purpose of funding 
capital improvements to the water system. There, the court held that the fee 
was authorized by statute, was not invalid as a tax, and was neither unreasona-
ble nor discriminatory since it resulted from a classification based upon relative 
benefits received by each like group of customers. The general facilities charge 
was based on a detailed long range plan identifying facilities needed for the 
water system to serve anticipated new customers for the next ten years. Based 
on this analysis, a series of projects were identified and the cost allocated to the 
new customers. A separate charge was developed for each class of customer: 
single family, multi-family, commercial/industrial and other. The monies col-
lected are restricted to paying for the new customers' share of the improve-
ments, either directly to fund the construction of the improvements or indirectly 
to pay for the new customers' share of the debt service of the revenue bonds. loo 
On the other hand, judicial reaction to impact fees without such a plan (espe-
cially if the question of authority is not adequately resolved) is demonstrated by 
Coronado Development Co. 1), City 0/ McPherJon. IOI The Supreme Court of Kan-
sas held that the municipality did not have the authority to require a developer 
to dedicate ten percent of his total acreage or the cash equivalent for public 
parks. The in-lieu fees received were to be placed into a special fund restricted 
only for the purpose of purchasing land for public areas. 102 The court construed 
the zoning enabling authority narrowly because the court decided the power to 
regulate subdivisions did not extend to requiring the payment of an in-lieu fee 
that was not sufficiently earmarked. In addition, the location of the park was 
not mapped anywhere: 
The foregoing statute specifically grants authority to make regulations for conven-
ient open spaces for recreation (parks and playgrounds) in accordance with the 
mapped plan. It would appear to go no further. It is not authority for a regulation 
requiring the developer to pay ten percent of the appraised value of the plarted 
area to the city in the event that - as is here stipulated and conceded - there are 
88 See Robens, Funding Public Capilal Facililies: How Communily Planning Can Help, in THE 
CHANGING STllUcnJRE OF INFRASTllUcnJRE FINANCE 15-16 <J. Nicholas ed. 1985) . 
.. 105 Wash. 2d 288, 714 P.2d 1163 (1986). 
100 Id. at 290, 714 P.2d at 1165-67. 
101 189 Kan. 174. 368 P.2d 51 (1962). 
101 /d. at 174. 368 P.2d at 51-52. 
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not public open spaces required by the planning commission and the governing 
body, within the subdivision, by any plan, mapped or otherwise .... Indeed, a 
careful analysis of the statute compels a conclusion there is nothing in any of its 
provisions authorizing the assessment of money as a revenue measure for other 
public areas. lOS 
d. The "Uniformity" Issue and Equal Protection 
An impact fee must be fairly and equitably levied among similarly situated 
landowners whose developments are contributing to the need for public facili-
ties. However, courts do not require perfect uniformity. Thus the Supreme 
Coun of Colorado upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance impos-
ing "facilities development fees" as a condition to connection with the sewer 
system. Plaintiffs, owners of apartment buildings, challenged the ordinance as 
an invalid tax and a violation of equal protection since it required only new 
customers to pay the fees. The coun held that since new connections are more 
directly related to the need for increased capacity than old connections, there is 
a rational basis for the distinction made by the ordinance. lo4 
The New Jersey courts have decided a line of cases upholding the validity of 
connection fees imposed to fund capital improvements to water and sewer sys-
tems based on equality between old and new users. The leading case establish-
ing the validity of such fees is Airwick Industries v. Carlstadt Sewerage Author-
ity.IOIi There, the court upheld connection fees imposed by the Authority to pay 
off bonded indebtedness incurred in building a new sewer system. The court 
recognized that both improved and unimproved propernes benefit from the 
increased capacity of the system: 
[nhe legislature intended that the installation and construction costs, i.e., debt 
service charges, should in the first instance be financed by the actual users but 
should ultimately be borne by all the properties benefited, including the unim-
pro~ed lands. For that reason there was provided a charge in the nature of a 
connection charge to be imposed upon unimproved properties in order that they 
assume a fair share of the original construction costS when they become improved 
properties. lo6 
103 [d. ae 175, 368 P.2d ae 53 (emphasis added). 
104 Loup-Miller Conser. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 676 P.2d 1170, 1173-75 (Colo. 
1984). 
105 57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18 (1970). 
108 [d. ae 122, 270 A.2d ae 26. 
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e. Calculation of Fee 
An impact fee ordinance must connect the fee charged to needs generated by 
the new development and benefits conferred. Calculation of fees should be tied 
to a study, report, or plan based on an analysis of the new development's im-
pact on the public facility. For example, most water and sewer impact fees are 
based on the amount of flowage required by a certain type of development. The 
analysis should demonstrate that the capital improvements planned with the 
funds collected are necessitated at least in part by the fee payer and that fees 
collected will adequately benefit the new development paying the fee. 107 
One way to show this is when the fee paid is less than the cost to the system 
of accommodating the new users. In Amherst Builders Association v. City of 
Amherst/08 the schedule of fees was based on average sewage flow for various 
types of structures, as estimated by the Environmental Protection Agency, re-
sulting in a fee of $400 for a single family home. In response to charges that 
the fee was invalid, the city introduced evidence demonstrating that the "capi-
tal cost" of each connection (the cost of facilities required to service each new 
user of the system) was an average of $1,186 per connection: 
While it is true that the $ 1 per gallon charge is not a mathematically precise 
estimate of the cost of service to each new user, appellant is hard-pressed to assert 
this as a basis for invalidating the ordinance when one considers that the resultant 
$400 fee is much less than the figure derived from a more precise analysis. 109 
The court also noted that, by keying the schedule to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency guidelines, the city was attempting to make the fee of each new 
user proportionate to the gallons of sewage flow contributed by a particular type 
of structure. "Thus, the fee attempts not only to equalize the burden between 
present and new users, but also among the latter, depending on the burden each 
puts on the system. "110 
Similarly, in Dunedin, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the water and 
sewer connection fees imposed were less than the costs the city would incur in 
accommodating new users of its water and sewer systems, leading the court to 
reject characterizing the fees as taxes. III The court stated that "[r}aising expan-
107 J. NICHOLAS. AMERCIAN PLANNING AssOCIATION, THE CALCULATION OF PROPORTIONATE-
SHARE IMPACT FEES, (1988); ]. Nicholas, Flordia's Experience With Impact Fm, in THE CHANG-
ING STRUCTURE OF INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE (J. Nicholas ed. 1985) {hereinafter Florida's Experi-
ence); Nicholas & Nelson, Determining the Appropriate Development Impact Fee Using the Rational 
Nexus Test, 54 J. AM. PLAN. A. 56 (1988). 
108 61 Ohio St. 2d 345, 349, 402 N.E.2d 1181, 1182 (1980). 
108 [d. at 352, 402 N.E.2d at 1184. 
110 [d., 402 N.E.2d at 1184. 
III Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 318 (Fla. 1976). 
318 University of Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 11:295 
sion capital by setting connection charges, which do not exceed a pro rata share 
of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion is 
reasonably required, if use of the money collected is limited to meeting the costs of 
expansion. "112 
The sewer and water "development fee" ordinances in Milton L. Coulter v. 
City of Rawlins,113 were upheld even though the city did not demonstrate how 
it arrived at a fee schedule. The facts state only that the city estimated a need 
for $36,000.00 in capital improvements to expand the sewer and water system 
to meet population projections, according to a plan developed by the city.11. 
However, the dissent noted that nothing in the record showed that new users 
were not paying all, or a disproportionate part of the capital cost of a water and 
sewer system for the city: 
(nhere is absolutely nothing in the record to reSect the relationship of the 
amount of such fees with any aspect of the annexed area .... The $750.00 
and $1,000.00 figures seem to have been plucked out of thin air .... 
Somewhere in the scheme of this situation, we must set guidelines of reasonable-
ness, or fairness, or uniformity. We cannot say that once a charge is called a 
"fee," it will have no perimeters, or fairness, or uniformity.ulI 
In Lafferty v. Payson City,116 an impact fe~ imposed partly for sewer and water 
was struck down by the Utah Supreme Court because the ordinance did not 
specify what the funds collected would be used for. The court remanded the 
case for a determination of the reasonableness of the fees in accordance with the 
test identified in its prior decision in Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan 
City,117 discussed above. The court held that the municipality has the burden 
of disclosing the basis of its calculations to whomever challenges the reasonable-
ness of the fees. 118 
The New Jersey enabling statutes for municipal utility aurhorities were 
amended in 1986 to provide a uniform method for calculating a permissible 
fair share connection fee for water and sewer systems.119 The court quoted the 
senate committee report on the amendment: 
Under the uniform connection fee formula established by this bill, a connector 
111 [d. at 320 (emphasis added). 
118 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983). 
114 [d. at 890. 
115 [d. at 905 (Rooney, C.J., dissenting in pan). 
118 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982). 
117 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). 
118 [d. at 904. 
119 Meglino v. Township Comm. of Eagleswood, 103 N.]. 144, 510 A.2d 1134, 1143 
(1986). 
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will pay a charge based upon the actual COSt of the physical connection, if made 
by the authority, plus a fair payment towards the cost of the system. The fair 
payment is to be computed by deducting from the tOtal debt service and capital 
expenditures previously made by the authority the amount of all gifts, contribu-
tions or subsidies received by the authority from any federal, state or local gov-
ernment or private person. The remainder is then divided by the number of 
service units served by the system, and the results are apportioned to the connec-
tor based upon the number of service units attributed to him. 
The bill requires that, in attributing service units to a connector, the estimated 
daily flow of water or sewerage for the connector shall be divided by the average 
daily flow for an average single family home in the authority's district. This per-
mits the authority to attribute a larger number of service units to a commercial 
building, for instance, than to a single family home.IIO 
Broward County, Florida, calculates road fees using a sophisticated computer 
model called TRIPS (Traffic Review and Impact Planning System). There is no 
road impact fee schedule as such. Instead, each requested plat approval is sub-
ject to analysis by TRIPS. TRIPS performs four essential tasks: (1) it estimates 
the traffic impact of each development; (2) it evaluates the capacity of road 
segments that are likely to be impacted; (3) it estimates the cost of improve-
ments; and (4) it calculates the development's fair share of the cost of the 
planned improvements. 121 
Impact fees can be computed without computers as, for example, in Palm 
Beach County. The Palm Beach County road impact fee system is based upon a 
set of data which showed that: (1) the average cost of a road was $300,000 per 
lane mile; (2) that traffic varied by land use types; (3) that average trip length 
was six miles; (4) that road capacity was 6,000 trips per day at a certain level of 
service. 122 In Home Builders & Contractors Association v. Board of County Com-
missioners,123 the court stated: 
{l1he Palm Beach County ordinance in question here was crafted with Dunedin's 
110 Id., 510 A.2d at 1134. 
III Ftank, How Road Impact Fees Art Working in Broward CtJun/y: The Computer Model, PLAN-
NING, June 1984, at 15. For detailed computation of impact fees as well as examples from many 
fee ordinances, see}. Nicholas, Florida's Experience, supra note 107. 
111 J. Nicholas, Florida's Experience, supra note 107 at 54. The fee for a single family home 
was determined to be $ 1,800, but was reduced to one sixth that amount or $ 300, for the 
following reasons: First, the county was receiving road revenues from the state motor fuels tax and 
from a road and bridge property tax, thus reducing its gross costs; second, reducing the fees 
allowed room for error in the formula components. Third, when the impact fee ordinance was 
litigated, the one-sixth fee schedule insured that the "Dunedin Test" (which requires that the fee 
cannot exceed the pro tata share of COStS attributable to the new development) was met. /d. at 54-
56. 
118 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
320 University of Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 11:295 
lessons 10 mind. The present ordinance recognized that the rapid rate of new 
development will require a substantial increase in the capacity of the county road 
system. The evidence shows that the cost of construction of additional roads will 
far exceed the fair share fees imposed by the ordinance. In fact the county sug-
gests that under the ordinance the cost will exceed the revenue produced by 
eighty-five percent. l24 
The court also noted that "[t)he formula for calculating the amount of the fee is 
not rigid and inflexible, but rather allows the person improving the land to 
determine his fair share by furnishing his own independent study of traffic and 
economic data in order to demonstrate that his share is less than the amount 
under the formula set forth in the ordinance."121! The Home Builders court also 
pointed out that the Palm Beach County ordinance avoided the defects inherent 
in the Broward County roads impact fee ordinance litigated in Broward County 
v. Janis Development Corp.126 The money generated by the Janis ordinance far 
exceeded the cost of meeting the needs brought about by the new 
development. 127 
All Florida local governments imposing impact fees utilize a "discount" or 
similar reduction from net cost to encourage use of the fee schedule. The dis-
count is designed to induce developers to pay the fees rather than incurring the 
expense of independent studies. The discounts also insure against violating the 
court imposed prohibition against charging impact fees which are greater than 
local governments' costS.128 
The above cases and examples demonstrate that impact fees must be ration-
ally related to needs generated by new development and benefits actually con-
ferred. As the dissent in Coulter pointed out, the amount of fees charged cannot 
1 •• ld. at 145. 
126 ld. 
ue 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
II? 446 So. 2d at 144. 
128 ). NICHOLAS, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM ON THE METHODS USED TO CALCULATE FRINGE 
AREA IMPACT FEES 4 (1986). 
Lee County, Florida, has drafted a "Fringe Area Road Impact Fee Ordinance," to im-
pose additional impact fees on outlying areas. Draft of An Ordinance Providing for the 
Imposition of an Impact Fee on Land Development in the Fringe Area of Lee County for 
Providing New Roads and Related Facilities in the Fringe Area which are Necessitated by 
Such New Development (Aug. 27, 1986) (Lee County, Fla.). The Lee County Plan does 
not provide for any public facilities to fringe areas; rather, development is allowed in these 
areas only if the development provides all necessary public support facilities itself. How-
ever, experience revealed that attempting to require each development, on its own, to be 
self-sustaining has many complications. Thus, the county developed fringe area impact 
fees, which are imposed in addition to the existing impact fees and have the objective of 
attaining the self-sufficiency for fringe area developmenrs required by the county plan. 
ld. at 1-2. 
1989 / REVIEW ESSAY 321 
be simply "plucked out of thin air."129 Calculation of fees should be tied to an 
analysis of needs and benefits to insure that fees charged satisfy the rational 
nexus test. 
f Segregation, Use and Refund of Funds: Avoidance of "Tax" 
Segregating fees collected into separate accounts apan from general funds 
meets the requirement that capital improvements or public facilities funded 
must "adequately" benefit the new development which paid the fee. In Home 
Builders & Contractors Association v. Board of County Commissioners,130 the court 
held that benefits accruing to the community generally do not adversely affect 
the validity of a development regulation as long as the fee does not exceed the 
cost of the improvements serving the new development and the improvements 
adequately benefit the development which is the source of the fee: "It is difficult 
to envision any capital improvement for parks, sewers, drainage, roads, or 
whatever, which would not in some measure benefit members of the commu-
nity who do not reside in or utilize the new development."131 Earlier, Amherst 
Builders Association v. City of Amherst, 132 upheld a sewer tap-in charge, requir-
ing the fees to be placed into a sewer fund, apan from general revenues. 133 
Dividing a local government into impact fee districts, depending upon the 
public facility or capital improvement, "localizes" the benefit, ensuring that 
capital improvements or public facilities funded "adequately" benefit the new 
development which paid the fee, even if the community at large also 
benefits. 13. 
Many impact fee ordinances and model ordinances-especially in Flor-
ida-divided their local governmeiu territory into "impact fee districts" or 
"zones of benefit." A draft Charlotte County impact fee ordinance divides the 
county into three zones. Sarasota County's road and park impact fee ordinance 
129 662 P.2d 888, 905 (Wyo. 1983) (Rooney, C.J., dissenting & concurring in pan). 
180 446 So. 2d at 140. 
181 Id. at 143. 
182 61 Ohio St. 2d 345, 348, 402 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (1980). 
183 In Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983), the court held: "The limitation 
on this power is the requirement that any fees collected in lieu of raw-land dedication must be 
earmarked to accounts for the purpose of acquiring needed park and maintenance of existing park 
facilities .. · Id. at 903. 
The Amherst court distinguished an earlier case, State ex rei. Waterbuty Dev. Co. v. Witten, 
54 Ohio St. 2d 412,377 N.E.2d 505 (1978), which struck down a water connection fee as a tax 
because the ordinance did not provide for earmarking of the funds: ··The fees collected pursuant 
to Ordinance 913.07 are earmarked specifically for a Sewer Revenue Fund, while the tap-in fees 
in Waterbury were not so earmarked for use .. · Amherst, 61 Ohio St. 2d at 347 n.2, 402 N.E.2d 
at 1183 n.2. 
134 Juregensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure, supra note 19, at 4l. 
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has two zones. A draft of Lee County road impact fee ordinance has twelve 
zones and its park impact fee ordinance has fifteen zones. The Florida court in 
Home Builder.r approved of segregating funds into forty zones, thereby localizing 
the benefit, but did not explicitly require such a system.1S11 Similarly, in 
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,138 the court upheld a condition to plat ap-
proval to 'dedicate land, pay an in-lieu fee or an impact fee to acquire more 
parks, favoring a restriction that the fees collected would be used for acquiring 
and developing new park lands within fifteen miles of the development which 
paid the fee. 
Commingling the fees collected with general revenues has usually led courts 
to strike down impact fee ordinances as unauthorized taxes. In the leading case 
of Contractor.r & Builder.r A.r.rociation v. City of Dunedin,13'7 the Florida Supreme 
Court upheld the concept of impact fees, but eventually struck down the fee for 
sewer and water connection for failing to sufficiently restrict the funds.138 A 
$720 impact fee for water connection met the same fate as the Ohio Supreme 
Court held in State ex rei. Waterbury Development Co. v. Witten1S9 the ordi-
nance was an illegal tax, after noting that fees collected were not earmarked. 
Similarly, the court in Lafferty v. Pay.ron City, uo struck down a $1,000 impact 
fee per family dwelling unit tied to the issuance of a building permit on the 
grounds that: "[An} impact fee deposited in the City's general revenues in this 
case is an illegal tax. "141 
A refund provision in an impact fee ordinance helps to ensure that the bene-
fit requirement of the rational nexus test is met. Such a provision commonly 
provides that the fee payer is entitled to have fees returned if they are not spent 
for the purpose for which they were collected within a reasonable period of time 
after their collection. The reasonableness of the time period should probably be 
tied to the capital funding planning period for the infrastructure in question. U2 
The roads impact fee ordinance in Home Builder.r contained a provision that 
funds collected .. must be spent within a reasonable time after collection (not 
later than six years) or returned to the present owner of the property."us In 
City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc.,144 the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down an 
13& Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Arpeeu, 1upra note I, at 549. 
18& 431 So. 2d 606, 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
187 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976). 
138 Id. at 321. 
189 54 Ohio St. 2d' 412,413,377 N.E.2d 505, 506 (1978). 
140 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982). 
141 Id. at 378 (footnote omitted). 
142 Jurgensmeyer, Funding Infra1trueture, 1upra note 19, at 41-42. 
148 Home Builders v. Board of Palm Beach County Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 14'2 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
144 280 Ark. 484, 486, 659 S.W.2d 505, 506 (1983). 
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ordinance requiring all developers of new residential subdivisions to dedicate 
land or pay a fee to be used for acquisition or development of parks in the 
vicinity. The ordinance was struck down because (1) there was insufficient plan-
ning for expenditure of the funds, and (2) "no provision for a refund to the 
contributor even if the residential area should never be developed as 
expected. "140 
A road impact fee was struck down as a tax 10 Broward County 1.1. Janis 
Development,146 when the court held: 
The fee here is simply an exaction of money to be put in trust for roads, which 
must be paid before developers may build. There are no other requirements. 
There are no specifics provided in the ordinance as to where and when these 
monies are to be expended . . . . The fee being a tax, then it is improper. 147 
Although a trifle long on the issue of authority (which is not a major issue in 
most cases) the LURF Report Legal Analysis chapter sets out some of the afore-
mentioned major cases14S and principle basis for evaluating the legality of an 
impact fee (the rational nexus test):149 there must be a reasonable connection 
between the fee charged and a development-generated problem which the fee 
will help alleviate. lliO The chapter also discusses the less-used "general public 
needs" test and the virtually unused "specifically and uniquely attributable" 
test. IOI The author reaches these tests by means of a rather superficial treatment 
of the so-called "takings" issuel02 (a regulation of land, if it goes "coo far" may 
be construed as a taking of property potentially leading to compensation under 
the fifth amendment to the federal constitution) which is of only marginal rele-
vance/liS even given the need to deal with the United States Supreme Court's 
'45 [d. at 488, 659 S.W.2d at 508. 
'48 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
'47 [d. at 375 (emphasis added). 
148 PAYING FOR GROWTH, ~upra note 5, at 101-10. 
'49 [d. at 102-10. 
'50 Callies, Property Rights, Jupra note I, at 633; Taub, Jupra note I. 
15' PAYING FOR GROWTH, JUpra note 5, at 101-02 (citing Pioneer TruJt, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 
N.E.2d 799 (1961), and AYerJ, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949». 
152 See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CAlliES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. 
Ct. 1232 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 107 S. 
Ct. 2378 (1987); Callies, Legal AJpectJ, Jupra note 1. 
153 In the process, the author has generalized to the point of error by failing to distinguish 
between "facial" (KeyJtone) and "applied" (Penn Central) challenges to land use ordinance regula-
tions made clear at the outset of land use common law at the Supreme Court level in Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (926) and Necrow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 
(1927) with the result that the tests set out at page 100 are at best garbled and at worst mislead-
ing and inapplicable. The problem is accentuated by discussion of Hawaii's Midkiff case, which is 
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decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission which forms a basis for 
upholding exactions of all sorts, including impact fees, under a nexus test. lI14 
None of this-fortunately-detracts from the summary of impact fee common 
law, followed later by a useful summary of those few Hawaii statutes and local 
ordinances and charter provisions which appear to support impact fees and 
other exactions on the land development process, and a survey of where the 
various counties have gone with the impact fee concept.1&11 Perhaps most useful 
of all is the checklist of potential drafting problems set out under the rubric, 
"Guidelines for Drafting a Defensible Impact Fee Ordinance."1&6 
of course not a regulatory taking case at all, but-as the Court defined it-a simple experience of 
the power of eminent domain, raising different issues-particularly with respect to public 
purpose-altogether. 
1M Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
155 PAYING FOR GROWlH, supra note 5, at 116-20. The Scorecard: Maui has a limited ordi-
nance (both geographically - in West Maui-and subjectively-only for traffic/roadways; Hawaii 
has a draft impact fee ordinance submirted to its Council; Kauai has an old Environmental 
Impact Assessment Ordinance (1980) which is a sort of catch-all measure, and Honolulu has 
pending before Council a Communiry Benefit Assessments bill which levies a general fee of rezon-
ing,making it of dubious validiry both because it is not development responsive (rezoning creates 
no new infrastructure needs, development does) and because it does not segregate funds into spe-
cific subject categories. The author understands that yet another draft ordinance for Honolulu is 
contemplated. 
156 Id. at 115-16: The following are guidelines which should be followed in drafting an im-
pact fee ordinance, to best assure the validiry of the ordinance from legal challenge based on state 
court decision in other jurisdiction and the Nollan decision. 
1. Incorporation 0/ Comprehensive Plans and Capital Improvement Plans. The ordinance 
should show a need for impact fees by relating the expenditure of the impact fees within 
the context of a capital improvement plan. The capital improvement plan should also be 
related to a communiry wide development plan. The ordinance must demonstrate that the 
need for additional facilities is required by new development, and not by existing deficien-
cies. This can be accomplished through determination of appropriate facilities standards, 
and formulation of a capital improvement plan to schedule improvements that will correct 
existing deficiencies, upgrade service levels, and accommodate new development. The cost 
of additional facilities must then be apportioned between new and existing development. 
2. Fees Must be Proportional to the Need Created. The ordinance must establish the propor-
tionate share of costs that the new development will bear. The factors which may be 
considered are: 
a. the COSt of existing facilities; 
b. the means by which existing facilities have been financed; 
c. the extent to which new development has already contributed, through tax assess-
ments, to the cost of providing existing excess capaciry; 
d. the extent to which new development will, in the future, contribute to the cost of 
consttucting currently existing facilities used by everyone in the communiry or by 
people who do not occupy the new development (by paying taxes in the future to 
payoff bonds used to build those facilities in the past); . 
e. the extent to which the newly developed properties are entitled to a credit for pro-
viding facilities that the communiry has provided in the past without charge to 
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2. Housing Exactions 
The author is considerably more skeptical with respect to the validity of 
other developments in the service area; 
f. extraordinary costs, if any, in serving the new development; and 
g. the time-price differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts paid at different 
times. 
The computation of the fee will vary depending on the improvement for which 
the fee is assessed and the financial restraints in the communiry. . 
3. Avoidance of Double Payment. The factors above should assure that new development 
does nOt pay for facilities twice i.e., once through impact fees and later through taxes or 
vice versa. In addition, the ordinance should take into consideration other forms of exac-
tions which may be imposed on the development, such as subdivision exactions or earlier 
in the zoning unilateral agreement. 
4. Creation of a Separate Fund. The funds should be earmarked and placed into a separate 
fund designed for the improvement(s) for which they were collected. 
5. Fee! MUJ/ be Spent to Benefit the Development. The improvement should be located 
where one may reasonably expect that occupants of the new development would use the 
improvements. However, the improvements need not be for the exclusive use of the occu-
pants of the new development. Palm Beach Counry, Florida resolves this problem by re-
quiring that road impact fees be spent within six miles of the new development. Mont-
gomery Counry and Maryland, establishes districts within which road impact fees must be 
spent. 
6. Fee! Must be Spent Within a Reasonable Time, or Refunded. The ordinance should ad-
dress the timing of the expenditure, since courtS will require that impact fees be spent 
within a reasonable time (e.g., 4 to 6 years from collection). Some ordinances delay collec-
tion of the fee to give more time to consolidate collecrio'n efforts for major capital improve-
ment projects. Many impact fee ordinances in Florida also contain a refund provision, 
under which funds which are not expended within a specified time are refunded to the 
current occupant of the property. 
7. Mechanism to Challenge the Fee and Exemptions. The ordinance should allow those who 
pay the fee to challenge the criteria on which the fee is based. This may be accomplished 
through a hearing or appeals procedure which would allow developers to present their own 
studies and data to support a lesser fee amount. The ordinance should contain a hardship 
waiver provision for those cases where assessment of the fee would leave the developer 
with no economically viable use of his property. Exemptions should be provided and based 
on non-economic criteria. 
8. Equal Application. The ordinance should assess fees on every development that creates a 
need for the infrastructure similarly. Both small and large developments should be assessed 
fees. 
9. Fees Should Only be Used for Construction. The fees should be used only for construction 
of facilities, and not for the maintenance, repair or operation of the facilities once con-
structed. Taxes or user fees should be utilized to cover the cost of these larter items. 
10. Time of Payment. The time of payment of the fee should be considered. A rypical 
scenario is to provide for the payment of the fee when the building permit is issued or at 
subdivision approval. 
11. Documentation of State Interest. Finally, in response to the Nollan case, local govern-
ments should establish that the exaction substantially advances a legitimate state interest. 
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housing exactions.1II7 Here, he is probably on solid ground once again. Tying 
the approval of land development to the dedication of low- and moderate-in-
come housing or the payment of fees to fund the building of low- and moder-
ate-income housing has been the most controversial exaction levied by local 
governments. 
Two commentators trace the evolution of exactions for housing and conclude: 
"{nhe fact that the output is housing does not present any compelling legal 
reason why the tests used to evaluate other development exactions may not be 
applied to such (housing) programs. "1118 The same commentators point out that 
by being too exotic certain exactions do not pass the rational nexus test: 
When the exactions related to traditional public service and facilities usually pro-
vided to new residential development, the courts have generally accepted the pro-
position that the new development causes some need for new facilities such as 
streets, sewers, water, parks and schools. Where the exaction is for some more 
exotic service or facility, such as the geothermal well involved in parks, the courts 
may conclude that no need exists and reject the validity of the exacrion without 
going funher. 169 
Whether the building of new housing causes a need for low- and moderate-
income housing is far from certain. Under one theory, when commercial devel-
opment and conventional market units use up a scarce resource (lands in coastal 
regions), which could have been used for the building of low- and moderate-
income housing, they can be required to contribute to low-income housing. 
This could also increase the property values of adjacent properties, thus exclud-
ing low- and moderate-income households from the communities. ISO 
One commentator doubts that a housing exaction meets the rational nexus 
test: 
[E}ven these more permissive cases [Walnut Creek and others} would have to be 
stretched quite far to justify the inclusionaty zoning ordinances. They do stand for 
the proposition that some exactions will be upheld although the need does not 
This can be done through a recital in the preamble of the ordinance to this effect and a 
finding by the legislative body that this is so based on the State Constitution or prevailing 
state laws. 
1&7 Id. at 110-15. 
1118 Bosselman & Stroud, Land Development LinkageJ. Jupra note 2, at 406. 
1&8 Id. at 398. 
leo See In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 94 N.J. 358,464 A.2d 1115. 1118-19 (1983). Under a 
quasi-public trust doctrine, since the market forces will result in the under allocation of low- and 
moderate-income housing, the local govemment should regulate land in a way to ensure the 
equitable distribution among economic groups. Cf Bozung, A POJitive ReJponJe to Growth Control 
PlanJ: The Orange County Inc/uJionary HouJing Program, 9 PEPPERDINE 1. REV. 819, 822 (1982). 
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arise entirely from and the benefits extend beyond the particular development. 
However, the causal connection between new development and the types of ser-
vices involved in the subdivision cases-streets, parks and schools-seems more 
immediate and direct than in the case of the indusionary ordinances. lSI 
The same commentator also raised the argument that permissive subdivision 
exactions pose a threat ,(0 an inequitable redistribution of wealth. Even if the 
need for lower cost housing could be connected with the new development, it 
could be argued that the benefits accrue to the community rather than to the 
particular developments. Couns might be hard pressed to see a reciprocal bene-
fit to having lower cost or subsidized housing interspersed within the new 
development. 
Municipalities have taken alternative paths in trying to cope with the prob-
lem that an increasing proponion of the population cannot afford adequate 
housing. Critics of traditional zoning point to its exclusionary effect. Minimum 
lot size, setbacks and front yard requirements contribute to the high cost of 
housing. In addition, many communities have residential districts zoned only 
for single family dwellings. These zoning regulations may offend notions of dis-
tributive justice. It has been well-argued that since the demand for affordable 
housing by low- and moderate-income households gready exceeds the supply 
and has a disproponionate impact upon minorities by excluding them from 
certain communities and contributing to the economic segregation of ethnic 
groups, municipalities should change zoning laws to foster the production of all 
alternatives of housing for all ethnic and economic groups.16l1 
The first method by which municipalities encourage the production of low-
and moderate-income housing is through mandatory set-asides. These require 
residential developers to provide a cenain percentage of their units below the 
market price be rented or sold to low- and moderate-income families.16s 
The second method is through linkage programs. Linkages involve condition-
ing approval of commercial development, like a downtown office building, upon 
a landowner's contributing to the construction of new housing. 164 
How couns have treated mandatory set-asides is generally beyond the scope 
of this essay. Suffice it to say that a heavily criticized and largely ignored deci-
sion from Virginia struck the concept down1611 and a pair of much-heralded 
New Jersey decisions has upheld them, though in relatively unique 
181 Kleven, Inciusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to 
Build Low COli Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432, 1498 (1974). 
18. Bozung, supra note 160, at 819-21. 
18a Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS 
CoNST. L.Q. 1015, 1015-16 (1976). 
184 Bosselman & Stroud, Land Development Linkages, supra note 2. 
1sa Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973). 
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circumstances. 166 
So far, the only jurisdiction to have squarely addressed the use of linkage fees 
for such housing has done so only at the dial court level, which issue was then 
neady avoided on procedural grounds on appeal. A recent Massachusetts case, 
Bonan v. City of Boston,167 presented an opportunity to settle the issue of 
whether linkages and mandatory set-asides could be sustained under a rational 
nexus analysis applied to other types of exactions. However, the Massachusetts 
Supreme] udicial Court resolved the cases on procedural grounds without ad-
dressing the substantive issues. 168 
In Bonan, the zoning commission of Boston granted Massachusetts General 
Hospital a special exception, amending the zoning map to permit a greater 
building density for the property than otherwise permitted by the zoning code. 
The exception was contingent upon a payment of a Development Impact Pro-
jea Exaction of five dollars for each square foot of gross floor area in the projea 
in excess of 100,000 square feet. 16S The plaintiffs, owners of an adjacent prop-
erty, maintained that they would be injured by the increased traffic, parking, 
people and loss of their view of the Charles River and the City of Cambridge. 
The trial court rejeaed any purported linkage. According to the court, the 
powers listed in the zoning enabling aa do: 
not include the power to exact a fee, a tax, or an in-kind contribution for the 
construction of low- and moderate-income housing as a condition of the granting 
of an amendment to the zoning map .... (Nor could the power be implied.} 
From this silence, the court must conclude that the power to exact linkage fees is 
not within the scope of the zoning power. 170 
Also, the court reasoned the nearly $4 million generated by the exaction was 
more like a tax than a fee since the benefits accrue to the community at large 
rather than the payer.l71 
166 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.]. 158, 456 A.2d 390 
(1983) where such set asides were required of recalcitrant local governments-not develop-
ers-only after a host of other measures such as eliminating design and non-health requirements 
like curbs and sidewalks and permitting mobile homes, to increase the supply of low-income 
housing, are tried and fail, and In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 1115 (1983) 
where the approved development would take up virrually all the developable land in the coastal 
zone in the region thereby eliminating any low-income housing there without a set-aside. 
167 398 Mass. 315,496 N.E.2d 640 (1986). 
166 Letter from Donald 1. Connors to James C. Nicholas (Sept. 29, 1986) (summarizing the 
holding in Bonan that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue); Memorandum from Donald 1. Con-
nors to Persons Interested in Boston's Linkage Ordinance (May 1, 1986). 
169 398 Mass. at 318-19, 496 N.E.2d at 642-43. 
170 Bonan v. City of Boston, No. 76438, slip op. at 17 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1986). 
171 Id. at 19. 
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This holding became moot when the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 172 
Two commentators cautiously predict that linkage programs will be upheld 
under the rational nexus test. 17S They recognize that the key issue is whether 
commercial development causes the need for new housing. Linkage programs 
are justified by the argument that new commercial development creates jobs. 
This attracts new residents to the area, increasing the demand for housing 
which increases the price of housing, creating a need for low- and moderate-
income housing. A San Francisco economist argues that "additions to the sup-
ply of office space don't make office employment any more than cribs make 
babies."I74 Even if the proposition that new development creates new jobs is 
accepted, it does not necessarily follow that such development generates a de-
mand for new housing. The cities are in a state of flux. Birth rates, death rates 
and migration might even lower the demand for housing. Moreover, the hous-
ing stock is in constant flux as units are being constantly built, demolished or 
converted to nonresidential use. Although the proof of causation to validate 
linkage is not insurmountable, it will take careful documentation by the cities 
that intend to adopt housing linkage programs.17~ 
On the other hand, the San Francisco housing linkage program has been ably 
defended on the grounds of housing mitigation: the need for housing for office 
workers who will be employed in new office buildings. 176 The theory goes that 
while the supply of housing in San Francisco will expand, it will not expand 
enough to provide housing for office workers on a market basis without govern-
ment intervention. Otherwise, those with the greater incomes will be housed as 
competition for increasingly short supplies heats up. The linkage fee is derived 
from calculating how many jobs new office development will generate and how 
many workers will be there employed who cannot be expected to find housing 
in San Francisco.177 
Dealing mainly with recent linkage programs in Boston and San Francisco, 
Planning for Growth concludes that despite the virtual dearth of appellate cases 
dealing with such linkage programs, there is little legal basis for them, particu-
larly when the requirement to provide housing is tied to a proposed residential 
development. These are not clearly distinguished in this chapter from the so-
called "voluntary" programs noted in the same category as if they are the same, 
in which a developer is provided with densiry or other construction and devel-
172 Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 320-21,496 N.E.2d, 640, 645 (1986). 
173 Bosse/man & Stroud, Land Development Linkages, supra note 2, at 411. 
174 Id. at 407. 
175 See id. at 407-09. 
178 Hausrath, Economic Basis for Linking Jobs and Housing in San Francisco, 54 J. AM. PuN. A. 
210 (1988). 
177 Id. at 212-13. 
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opment bonuses if certain percentages of affordable housing are constructed. 
There is obviously some choice inherent in the former, whereas there is none in 
the latter. The chapter concludes-as does the conclusion later-that raw 
linkage without any attempt at forming a nexus between the housing de-
manded and the development from which demanded, is in all likelihood legally 
flawed. The discussion which follows attempts to differentiate so-called inclusio-
nary zoning, citing primarily the line of cases from New Jersey which appear to 
require such housing to be built in developing communities.178 It is worth 
noting, however, that these cases arose when recalcitrant communities (not leery 
developers as in Hawaii) failed to take their fair share of low-income residents 
fleeing central cities. Moreover, the requirement that these communities require 
mandatory construction of low-income housing as part of other residential de-
velopments applied only to those communities which: (1) were "developing" 
and (2) had undertaken a plethora of other measures first to attempt to provide 
low-income housing, specifically such as permitting mobile homes and stripping 
their existing ordinances of none-health and safety requirements which drove 
up the cost of housing-like curbs, sidewalks, and so forth. The chapter con-
cludes with a cautionary note that it should not be assumed these are applicable 
to Hawaii. 
B. The Interviews 
In early 1988 the authors interviewed state and county planning directors 
and other officials whose responsibilities would include providing infrastructure 
and housing through the land development process.179 While it is possible to 
criticize devoting nearly half the report to responses to a common set of ques-
tions "in their entirety"180 and wholly without editing, some of those responses 
are illuminating, showing as they do a common dedication to construct both 
infrastructure and public housing largely at the expense of the private sector by 
charges on the land development process. lSI Nowhere is the failute of tradi-
178 MI. Laurel, 93 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983); Egg Harbor, 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 
1115 (1983). 
179 Harold S. Masumoto, Director, Office of State Planning; Joseph K. Conant, Executive 
Director, State Housing Finance & Development Corporation; Donald A. Clegg, Chief Planning 
Officer, City & County of Honolulu; John P. Whalen, Direaor of Land Utilization, City & 
County of Honolulu; Michael Moon, Director of Housing & Community Development, City & 
County of Honolulu; Christopher L. Hart, Director of Planning, County of Maui; Albert Lono 
Lyman, Director of Planning, County of Hawaii; Tom Shigemoto, Director of Planning, County 
of Kauai; Foreward to PAYING FOR GROWTH, Jupra note 5. 
180 PAYING FOR GROWTH, Jupra note 5, at 15-86. 
181 Id. at 36, 38-42 (Donald Clegg); id. at 68, 71 (Christopher Hart); id. at 77 (Albert 
Lyman); id. at 82, 85 (Tom Shigemoto). 
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tional sources of revenue-the property tax, the excise tax, and so forth-more 
evident. And nowhere is it more freely admitted that exactions for housing and 
infrastructure have been traditionally exacted for quite some time on an ad hoc 
basis.18i 
What the impact fees and housing exactions formally proposed and in place 
would do is regularize the process adding certainty to development cost projec-
tion where little exists today.18s What disagreement there is generally revolves 
around who should make the exaction, particularly for housing: the state or the 
counties?184 
C. Planning and Economics 
The brief introductoty chapter on planningl811 sets the tone of the study 
nicely. It lists key definitionsl86 together with a concise histoty of development 
regulations before fixing on the impact fee and the critical requirements of "ra-
tional nexus.' '187 
A useful example of how such an impact fee would be calculated, taken from 
Broward County, Florida, then follows. 188 
181 Id. at 24 (Harold Masumoto); id. at 52 (John Whalen); id. at 59 (Michael Moon). 
188 Id. at 31 (Joseph Conant); id. at 49 (John Whalen). 
184 Id. at 41 (Donald Clegg); id. at 25 (Harold Matsumoto); id. at 54 (John Whalen); id. at 
66 (Christopher Hart). 
185 Rae, Impact Feu and Housing Exactions Programs: A Planning Overt/iew, in PAYING FOR 
GROWTH, supra note 5, at 1. 
188 Impact Fees: Single payments required to be made by builders or developers at the time of 
development approval, and calculated to be the development's proportionate share of the capital 
COSt of providing major facilities. Because they are single payments, as opposed to periodic pay-
ments such as taxes, it means that the capital outlay necessary to construct the facility or improve-
ment is available at the time the facility is needed. Additionally, because the fee is based on a 
proportionate share, new development will not be required to pay other than its own way. 
Nexus: Some courtS discuss a "rational nexus," while others look to an "essential nexus." From 
a plarming perspective, what is important is that there is a dear and documented connection or 
link between the impacts caused by a development project and the exactions imposed upon the 
developer to mitigate negative impacts. PAYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 5, at 2. 
187 Id. at 4. 
188 A general formula can be shown for calculating an impact fee for a given facility. An 
example of a park impact fee from Broward Counry, Florida is provided, which is designed to 
incorporate planning, legal, and economic considerations. The formula has three basic compo-
nents, as shown below: 
1. Total cost of park development per dwelling unit. The first step is to determine what 
the counry's standards are for parks. In this example, there is a standard of 7.5 acres of 
park for every 1,000 people. Second, the average household size in Broward is 2.5 persons 
per unit. Third, it costs Broward County $38,140 for acquisition and development of each 
acre of park. Given these faces, the total cost per unit of new development can then be 
calculated as follows: 
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There then follows a brief discussion of inclusionary zoning and housing 
linkage programs. The author concludes generally that neither may be the most 
productive means for increasing the amount of low-income housing available in 
Hawaii.1s9 In sum, this chapter is well-organized and concise. 
The economics chapter is tough sledding.190 The author analyzes the concepts 
of impact fees and development exactions according to several economic theories 
and concludes that impact fees may theoretically represent a more equitable 
mechanism of providing for necessary public infrastructure than ad hoc exac-
tions, but they are likely to increase the costs of both rental and market housing 
in the process. However, apparently not all subject areas are amenable to impact 
fee treatment. The most salient deviation apparently occurs in the use of fees or 
exactions to provide for low-income housing. They have "no social merit and 
should be abandoned"191 since they have truly pernicious effects on the supply 
and price of low-income housing. Rather, suggests the author, more efficient 
$38,140 x 7.5 = $286,050 per 1,000 residents. 
$286,050/1,000 = $286.05 per person 
2.5 x $286.05 = $715.13 
The cost of park development per residential unit = $ 715. 13 
2. Determine other revenue sources that contribute to park development. The function of 
this step is to acknowledge that there are other sources of revenue for the park develop-
ment than the impact fee. These must be taken into account so that the impact fee reflects 
real costs to government. Such revenues typically come from State and Federal grants, 
previously collected property taxes on undeveloped land, and future payments of new resi-
dents to existing obligation bonds. In Broward County, it was found that State and Fed-
eral grants paid for 25% of park COSts. There was also an outstanding obligation bond for 
parks. It was calculated that undeveloped land was paying \0% of the bond debt service 
through property taxes. Thus the land will have already paid \0% of its park cost. It was 
further found that a new home will pay $25 per year for the next 20 years toward park 
bond issues. Revenues can then be calculated as follows: 
• 25% of $715.13 = $178.78 (Federal and State grants) 
10% of $ 715.13 = $71. 5 1 (portion paid by undeveloped land) 
• Present value of $25 per year for 20 year = $264.75 (future bond payments by a new 
house) 
• Contribution of other sources to park development = $515.04. 
3. Amount of impact fee. The impact fee per new dwelling can then be calculated by 
subtracting other revenue sources from the cost of providing the service. 
In the park example, this is: 
Park cost per dwelling $ 715.13 
Less other revenues 
Impact fee per dwelling 
Id. at 16. 
189 Id. at 9- 10. 
515.04 
$199.99 
190 PAYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 5, ch. 4. 
191 Rose, Impact Fees and Housing Exaction Programs: An Economic Ana/ysis, in PAYING FOR 
GROWTH, supra note 5, at 137. 
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and equitable means are available to achieve housing objectives, such as relaxing 
zoning and permitting restrictions (supply-side restraints) and providing hous-
ing vouchers for low-income tenants and time-phased income tax credits for 
first-time moderate income home buyers. 192 
These are incisive conclusions, and they are amply documented in the analy-
sis portion of the chapter. That analysis is complex, however, and the author 
has thoughtfully provided the less venturesome reader with an executive sum-
mary which, while requiring the reader to accept the conclusions at face value, 
has the virtue of simpliciry and clariry. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the legal trends across the country clearly favor the upholding 
of impact fees which: 
1. are designed to help pay for public projects the need for which is generated 
by the development upon which the fee is levied; 
2. are segregated from general funds and placed in a designated special fund to 
pay for the public project for which levied; 
3. are used promptly for such projects and not held for years. 
It is useful, but not necessary, for such fees to be: 
1. related to plans and studies showing the need for such public projects and 
their relation to anticipated development; 
2. part of a funding program for capital facilities in which there is a substantial 
public contribution from other sources of funds; 
3. spent for public projects which have more, rather than less, direct connection 
to the development upon which fees are being levied. 
In other words, courts are concerned that the fee be reasonably arrived at 
(mathematical precision is not required, however) and that the paying develop-
ment be benefited in some manner, though neither substantial public benefit 
nor relatively minor development benefit will render an impact fee illegal, as the 
cases in California and Florida-two developing states which make substantial 
use of such fees and in which there has been substantial litigation-clearly 
indicate. 
192 Id. at 141. 

